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作者：Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：In many economic situations, neither prices nor authority rules. Rather, individual behavior is governed by social norms that specify what is allowed (socially acceptable) and what is forbidden (socially unacceptable). These norms can emerge in a decentralized way and can serve as a method to bring order to economic situations. The key component of our solution concept is a uniform permissible set which plays a role parallel to that of a price system in competitive equilibrium. The concept is ...
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作者：Gale, Douglas; Gottardi, Piero
作者单位：New York University; University of Essex; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University; University of Essex
摘要：We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity services of bank deposits make deposits a cheaper source of funding than equity. In equilibrium, banks pass on part of this funding advantage in the form of lower interest rates to firms that borrow from them. Firms and banks choose their capital structures to balance the benefits of debt financing against the risk of costly default. An increase in the equity of a firm makes its debt less risky ...
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作者：Burkett, Justin; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We model multi-unit auctions in which bidders' valuations are multidimensional private information. Under a natural constraint on aggregate demand we show that the last accepted bid uniform-pricing rule admits a unique equilibrium with a simple characterization: bids are identical to those submitted in a single-unit first price auction. The form of equilibrium bids suggests that last accepted bid uniform-pricing is a generalization of single-unit first-pricing: in both auctions winners pay the...
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作者：Gorno, Leandro; Iachan, Felipe S.
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study a research and development race by extending the standard investment under uncertainty framework. Each firm observes the stochastic evolution of a new product's expected profitability and chooses the optimal time to release it. Firms are imperfectly informed about the state of their opponents, who could move first and capture the market. We characterize a family of priors for which the game admits a stationary equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium is unique and can be explicitly ...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Liu, Tingjun; Sogo, Takeharu
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick; University of Hong Kong; SKEMA Business School; Universite Cote d'Azur
摘要：We analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations, and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash. With sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs, the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities. When bidders are ex-ante identical, higher royalty rates-which tie payments more closely to bidder valuations-increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auc...
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作者：Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia
作者单位：University of Leicester; University of Nottingham
摘要：We use a simple cost-benefit analysis to derive optimal similarity judgments - addressing the question: when should we expect a decision maker to distinguish between different time periods or different prizes? Our key premise is that cognitive resources are costly and are to be deployed only where they really matter. We show that this simple insight can explain a number of observed anomalies, such as: (i) time inconsistency, (ii) magnitude effects, (iii) interval length effects. For each of th...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena
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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Ramos, Joao
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Southern California; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：In an ongoing relationship of delegated decision making, a principal consults a biased agent to assess projects' returns. In equilibrium, the principal allows future bad projects to reward fiscal restraint, but cannot commit to indefinite rewards. We characterize equilibrium payoffs (at fixed discounting), showing that Pareto optimal equilibria are implemented via a two-regime 'Dynamic Capital Budget'. Rather than facing backloaded rewards-as in dynamic agency models with commitment power-the ...
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作者：Burguet, Roberto; Caminal, Ramon
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We propose a new solution concept for TU cooperative games in characteristic function form, the SCOOP, which builds on the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) by adding a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition. The SCOOP specifies the probability of success and the payoffs to each coalition. The players share the surplus of a coalition according to the NBS. The disagreement payoffs are computed as the expectation of payoffs in other coalitions, using a common prob...
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作者：Izhakian, Yehuda
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：Ordering alternatives by their degree of ambiguity is crucial in economic and financial decision-making processes. To quantify the degree of ambiguity, this paper introduces an empirically-applicable, outcome-independent (up to a state space partition), risk-independent, and attitude-independent measure of ambiguity. In the presence of ambiguity, the Bayesian approach can be extended to uncertain probabilities such that aversion to ambiguity is defined as aversion to mean-preserving spreads in...
