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作者：Khan, M. Ali; Qiao, Lei; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：The economic literature with an atomless countably additive measure space to model the interaction of agents in a large society is enormous. However, there have been a number of attempts to relax the countable additivity assumption by working with a finitely (but non-countably) additive measure space (such as the set of natural numbers with a density charge). The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the necessity of countable additivity in modeling a large society in terms of the exist...
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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Potoms, Tom
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of Sussex
摘要：Transferable utility (TU) is a widely used assumption in economics. In this paper, we weaken the TU property to a setting where distinct Pareto frontiers have empty intersections. We call this the no-intersection property (NIP). We show that the NIP is strictly weaker than TU, but still allows to derive several desirable properties. We discuss the NIP in relation to several models where TU has turned out to be a key assumption: models of assortative matching, principal-agent models with asymme...
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作者：Xiang, Wang
作者单位：Renmin University of China
摘要：Consider a moral hazard scenario in which a monitor must detect deviations to provide proper incentives to attain an efficient outcome. What if the monitor himself were to deviate after being bribed by his monitored subject? In this paper, I model a multi-agent public-good provision game in which each player prefers shirking to working in the absence of exogenous enforcement and can bribe those assigned to monitor him. I find that an optimally designed monitoring structure must have players ar...
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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Southern California
摘要：Many school districts apply the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm after ties among students are resolved exogenously. This paper compares two common tie-breaking rules: one in which all schools use a common lottery, and one in which each school uses a separate independent lottery. We identify the balance between supply and demand as the determining factor in this comparison. We analyze a two-sided assignment model with random preferences in over-demanded and under demanded market...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：Georgetown University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after each marginal change has been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both. We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with the same center, with preferenc...
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作者：Takahashi, Satoru; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We analyze the robustness of equilibria in sequential games when there is almost common certainty of payoffs. We show that a generic extensive-form game may have no robust equilibrium behavior, but has at least one robust equilibrium outcome, which is induced by a proper equilibrium in its normal-form representation. Therefore, backward induction leads to a unique robust outcome in a generic perfect-information game. We also discuss close relation between robustness to incomplete information a...
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作者：Lanier, Joshua
作者单位：Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the demand for financial assets to satisfy the law of demand (prices and quantity demanded move in opposite directions) when preferences take the expected utility, multiplier preferences, Choquet expected utility, and the maxmin expected utility forms. For the first three models the law of demand holds when the variation in the coefficient of relative risk aversion stays within a specified bound. Ensuring the law of demand holds in the maxmin ...
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作者：Piacquadio, Paolo G.
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：This paper addresses the evaluation of intergenerational allocations in an uncertain world. It axiomatically characterizes a class of criteria, named reference-dependent utilitarian, that assess allocations relative to a stochastic reference. The characterized criteria combine social concerns for ex-ante equity capturing the idea that generations should be treated equitably before risk is resolved and for ex-post fairness capturing the idea that generations should be treated equitably after ri...
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作者：Basu, Pathikrit; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Hoshino, Tetsuya; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal real...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：We provide unified strategic foundations for the Nash (1950) and Kalai (1977) solutions in the context of negotiations under liquidity constraints. We propose an N-round game where in each round a seller and a buyer with limited payment capacity negotiate a bundle of divisible goods, where bundle sizes can vary across rounds, according to Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offer game. The game implements the Nash solution if N = 1 and the Kalai solution if N = +infinity and bundle sizes are infin...
