Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bahel, Eric
• 署名单位: Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105168
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: TU game; Hyperadditive; core; Objection; network; matching

摘要

For the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce and study the notion of hyperadditivity, a new cohesiveness property weaker than convexity and stronger than superadditivity. It is first established that every hyperadditive game is balanced: we propose a formula allowing to compute some core allocations; and this leads to the definition of a single-valued solution that satisfies core selection for hyperadditive games. This new solution coincides with the Shapley value on the subclass of convex games. Furthermore, we prove that the bargaining set of a hyperadditive game is equal to its core. It is shown that many well-known economic applications satisfy hyperadditivity. Our work extends (and gives a unifying explanation for) various results found in the literature on network games, assignment games and convex games. In addition, some new results are derived for these respective families of games (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.