Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schipper, Burkhard C.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105365
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: self-confirming equilibrium; Conjectural equilibrium; Extensive-form rationalizability; unawareness; extensive-form games; learning

摘要

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are self-destroying as a player's representation of the game may change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensive-form game with unawareness that together with the players' play determines the transition to possibly another extensive-form game with unawareness in which players are now aware of actions that they have discovered. A discovery process is rationalizable if players play extensive-form rationalizable strategies in each game with unawareness. We show that for any game with unawareness there is a rationalizable discovery process that leads to a self confirming game that possesses a self-confirming equilibrium in extensive-form rationalizable conjectures. This notion of equilibrium can be interpreted as a steady-state of both a discovery and learning process. (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).