Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hagen, Martin; Hernando-Veciana, Angel
• 署名单位: CUNEF Universidad; Durham University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Mechanism design; bilateral trade; Multidimensional private information; posted prices; Dominant strategies; collusion-proofness

摘要

A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch condition. We provide a unified proof of both findings via the property of non-bossiness. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.