Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miralles, Antonio; Pycia, Marek
• 署名单位: University of Messina; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105303
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Random assignment; Pseudomarkets; welfare theorems; Walrasian equilibrium; Discrete markets; Multi-unit demand; single-unit demand; complementarities; constraints

摘要

We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design. (C) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.