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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, and that the monitoring is sufficiently connected. In all repeated game equilibria, each period play is an equilibrium of the stage game. When the monitoring is approximately connected and equilibrium str...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Duke University
摘要：We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observation, in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inflicts shame on the DM. We deriv...
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作者：Balasko, Yves
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：It is shown that two arbitrary equilibria in the general equilibrium model without sign restrictions on endowments can be joined by a continuous equilibrium path that contains at most two critical equilibria. This property is strengthened by showing that regular equilibria having an index equal to 1, a necessary condition for stability, can be joined by a path containing no critical equilibrium. These properties follow from the real-algebraic nature of the set of critical equilibria in any fib...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially implementable. We show that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private valu...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
摘要：This paper examines circumstances under which subjectivity enhances the effectiveness of inductive reasoning. We consider agents facing a data-generating process who are characterized by inference rules that may be purely objective (or data-based) or may incorporate subjective considerations. Agents who invoke no subjective considerations are doomed to ineffective learning. The analysis places no computational or memory limitations on the agents: the role for subjectivity emerges in the presen...
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作者：Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to Nash-implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations, show that these conditions are inconsistent with the contraction p...
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作者：Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Troeger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Mannheim
摘要：We provide a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in generalized-private-value environments. In a broad class of these environments, the mechanism-selection game has a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium that has a strong neologism-proofness property. Equilibrium allocations that satisfy this property are characterized in terms of the players' incentive and participation constraints, and can be computed using standard methods.
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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Hao, Li; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Hong Kong; University of British Columbia
摘要：Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the end, or a deadlock, in which concessions end permanently. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case, but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between the negotiating ...
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作者：Reffgen, Alexander; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1 x Am of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.
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作者：Chade, Hector; Schlee, Edward
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We solve the principalagent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent whose riskiness (loss chance) is private information, a problem introduced in Stiglitz's (1977) seminal paper. For an arbitrary type distribution, we prove several properties of optimal menus, such as efficiency at the top and downward distortions elsewhere. We show that these results extend beyond the insurance problem we emphasize. We also prove that the principal always prefers an agent facing a larger loss and ...
