Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reffgen, Alexander; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
• 署名单位: Lund University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE909
• 发表日期: 2012-09-01
• 页码: 663-688
• 关键词: Multiple public goods; strategy-proofness; voting under constraints; additive preferences; separable preferences; D71

摘要

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set A = A1 x Am of m finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over A, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over A.