Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Troeger, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE787
• 发表日期: 2012-09-01
• 页码: 465-488
• 关键词: Informed principal; mechanism design; private values; strong unconstrained Pareto optimum; D82; D86

摘要

We provide a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in generalized-private-value environments. In a broad class of these environments, the mechanism-selection game has a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium that has a strong neologism-proofness property. Equilibrium allocations that satisfy this property are characterized in terms of the players' incentive and participation constraints, and can be computed using standard methods.