-
作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that dominates some other options in the choice set. This paper argues that both effects may result from an individual's attempt to overcome the difficulty of making a choice in the absence of a single criter...
-
作者：Nascimento, Leandro
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper presents an analysis of the problem of aggregating preference orderings under subjective uncertainty. Individual preferences, or opinions, agree on the ranking of risky prospects, but are quite general because we do not specify the perception of ambiguity or the attitude toward it. A convexity axiom for the ex ante preference characterizes a (collective) decision rule that can be interpreted as a compromise between the utilitarian and the Rawlsian criteria. The former is characteriz...
-
作者：Nakajima, Daisuke
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper investigates first-price and Dutch auctions when bidders have preferences exhibiting the Allais paradox. We characterize an equilibrium for both auctions, paying particular attention to the dynamic inconsistency problems that can arise with such preferences. We show that the Dutch auction systematically yields a higher revenue than the first-price auction. This stands in sharp contrast to the presumption that these auctions are strategically equivalent, which is indeed valid in the ...
-
作者：Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bidders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several auction formats are being used and the distribution of bids, but not the associated formats, is disclosed. I employ the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005) to model such situations. First-price auctions in which past bids are disclosed in an an...
-
作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.
-
作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; Roemer, John E.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris Cite; Yale University; Yale University
摘要：Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a judge or arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the judge is presented with a utility possibility set in R(+)(2). He/she must choose an allocation in the set, constrained only by Nash's axioms, in the sense that a penalty is paid if and only if a utility allocation is chosen at date T that is inconsistent...
-
作者：Robson, Arthur; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Yale University
摘要：Psychologists report that people make choices on the basis of decision utilities that routinely overestimate the experienced utility consequences of these choices. This paper argues that this dichotomy between decision and experienced utilities may be the solution to an evolutionary design problem. We examine a setting in which evolution designs agents with utility functions that must mediate intertemporal choices, and in which there is an incentive to condition current utilities on the agent'...
-
作者：Segal, Ilya; Whinston, Michael D.
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of congruence. We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Moreover, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic s...
-
作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Aumann (1976) shows that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E do coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty finite event F with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at F that the agents cannot t...
-
作者：Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Boston College
摘要：We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasilinear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-core is always nonempty in public goods economies but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particul...
