Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE898
• 发表日期: 2012-09-01
• 页码: 609-661
• 关键词: Mechanism design; implementation; STABILITY; learning; C62; C72; C73; D02; D03; D51

摘要

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to Nash-implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations, show that these conditions are inconsistent with the contraction property when message spaces are one-dimensional, and then show how to use additional dimensions to achieve dynamic stability while gaining budget balance out of equilibrium.