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作者：Martimort, David; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often been viewed as a mechanism design problem under the aegis of an uninformed mediator. This paper focuses on institutional contexts without such a mediator. Contributors privately informed on their willingness to pay non-cooperatively offer contribution schedules to an agent who produces the public good on their behalf. In any separating and informative equilibrium of this common agency game under asymmetric information, i...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We prove that any regular evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Boston University; Northwestern University
摘要：The de Finetti Theorem is a cornerstone of the Bayesian approach. Bernardo (1996, p. 5) writes that its message is very clear: if a sequence of observations is judged to be exchangeable, then any subset of them must be regarded as a random sample from some model, and there exists a prior distribution on the parameter of such model, hence requiring a Bayesian approach. We argue that although exchangeability, interpreted as symmetry of evidence, is a weak assumption, when combined with subjectiv...
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Munich
摘要：We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We considerMarkov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable and show that all such equilibria exhibit an encouragement effect relative to the single-agent optimum. There is no equilibrium in which all players use cutoff strategies. Owing to the encouragement effect, asymm...
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作者：Virag, Gabor
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices. An outstanding conjecture (e.g., Peters and Severinov 1997) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This conjecture is confirmed in this paper: we show that if all sellers have zero costs, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 in distribution. Under further conditions there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. In t...
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作者：Saporiti, Alejandro
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n - 1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals' most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only prop...
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作者：Board, Simon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision systematically leads to two distortions relative to the efficient solution: first, agents are segregated too finely; second, too many agents are excluded from all groups. We demonstrate that these distortions are ...
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作者：Kim, KyungMin
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular, there is uncertainty over whether the monopolist is committed to a price (i.e. she may be a commitment type). Consequently, consumers are no longer certain that the price will change over time. I consi...
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作者：Piccione, Michele; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which exists and includes the core. We investigate a refinement, the strongly stable social order...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice func...
