Optimal deadlines for agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Damiano, Ettore; Hao, Li; Suen, Wing
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Hong Kong; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE847
• 发表日期: 2012-05-01
• 页码: 357-393
• 关键词: Repeated proposals; war of attrition; interdependent values

摘要

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the end, or a deadlock, in which concessions end permanently. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case, but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between the negotiating parties is intermediate, the optimal deadline is positive and finite, and is characterized by the shortest time that allows efficient information aggregation in equilibrium.