Ashamed to be selfish

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Duke University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE674
• 发表日期: 2012-01-01
• 页码: 99-124
• 关键词: Shame; selfishness; subjective norm; dictator game; Nash bargaining solution; C78; D63; D64; D80; D81

摘要

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observation, in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inflicts shame on the DM. We derive a representation that identifies the DM's private ranking of allocations, her subjective norm, and her shame. The normatively best allocation can be further characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem.