Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Hwang, Sung-Ha; Katsoulakis, Markos; Rey-Bellet, Luc
署名单位:
Sogang University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Crete
刊物名称:
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
1933-6837
DOI:
10.3982/TE829
发表日期:
2013-09-01
页码:
829-874
关键词:
Spatial evolutionary games
Deterministic Approximation
long-range interactions
equilibrium selection
traveling front solutions
pattern formation
摘要:
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals playing a game with their neighbors in a spatial domain and describe the time evolution of the strategy profile of individuals over space. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations of strategy revision stochastic processes. These equations generalize the existing ordinary differential equations such as replicator dynamics and provide powerful tools for investigating the problem of equilibrium selection. Deterministic equations allow the identification of many interesting features of the evolution of a population's strategy profiles, including traveling front solutions and pattern formation.
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