Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1239
• 发表日期: 2013-05-01
• 页码: 431-466
• 关键词: Dominant strategy implementation; cycle monotonicity; dichotomous preferences; generation monotonicity

摘要

We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains in a private values and quasilinear utility setting. In such multidimensional domains, an agent's type is characterized by a single number, the value of the agent, and a nonempty set of acceptable alternatives. Each acceptable alternative gives the agent utility equal to his value and other alternatives give him zero utility. We identify a new condition, which we call generation monotonicity, that is necessary and sufficient for implementability in any dichotomous domain. If such a domain satisfies a richness condition, then a weaker version of generation monotonicity, which we call 2-generation monotonicity (equivalent to 3-cycle monotonicity), is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We use this result to derive the optimal mechanism in a one-sided matching problem with agents who have dichotomous types.