Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
署名单位：
University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
刊物名称：
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1933-6837
DOI：
10.3982/TE1126
发表日期：
2014-01-01
页码：
1-40
关键词：
摘要：
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium trades are unique. Any traded contract must yield zero profit. If a quality is actually traded, then it is efficiently traded. Depending on parameters, both qualities may be traded, or only one of them, or the market may break down to a no-trade equilibrium.
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