Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peski, Marcin
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1390
• 发表日期: 2014-09-01
• 页码: 651-694
• 关键词: Repeated games; incomplete information; reputation; C73

摘要

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and important class of games with multisided incomplete information. When players become sufficiently patient, all Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoffs can be approximated by payoffs in sequential equilibria in which information is revealed finitely many times. The set of equilibrium payoffs is typically larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without discounting and is larger than the set of payoffs obtained in belief-free equilibria. The results are illustrated in bargaining and oligopoly examples.