Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calcagno, Riccardo; Kamada, Yuichiro; Lovo, Stefano; Sugaya, Takuo
• 署名单位: emlyon business school; Yale University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1202
• 发表日期: 2014-05-01
• 页码: 409-434
• 关键词: Revision games; pre-opening; finite horizon; equilibrium selection; asynchronous moves

摘要

We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally revised action is taken at the deadline. In two-player common interest games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In opposing interest games, which are 2x2 games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.