Implementation with interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1440
• 发表日期: 2015-09-01
• 页码: 923-952
• 关键词: Auctions; incentive compatibility; mechanism design; interdependent values; ex post incentive compatibility

摘要

It is well known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We further show that truthful revelation is an approximate ex post equilibrium. Last, we show that in replicated settings, aggregate payments sufficient to induce truthful revelation go to zero.