Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• 署名单位: Kobe University; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1470
• 发表日期: 2015-05-01
• 页码: 445-487
• 关键词: Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium; simultaneous ascending auction; strategy-proofness; EFFICIENCY; heterogeneous objects; non-quasi-linear preferences

摘要

We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.