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作者：Geromichalos, Athanasios; Herrenbrueck, Lucas; Salyer, Kevin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Simon Fraser University
摘要：A consistent empirical feature of bond yields is that term premia are, on average, positive. The majority of theoretical explanations for this observation have viewed the term premia through the lens of the consumption based capital asset pricing model. In contrast, we harken to an older empirical literature that attributes the term premium to the idea that short maturity bonds are inherently more liquid. The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical justification of this concept. To that...
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作者：Ulbricht, Robert
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent so as to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two information asymmetries are mutually enforcing: if one is relaxed, delegated search is efficient. With both asymmetries prevailing simultaneously, search is almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too ea...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Meneghel, Idione; Tourky, Rabee
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Queensland
摘要：We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games of incomplete information set in L. J. Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities, and payoffs. Players' information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state contingent action profiles. In the class of games we consider, player preferences satisfy v...
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作者：Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We study nonstationary dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection in which trade is bilateral and prices are determined by bargaining. Examples include labor markets, housing markets, and markets for financial assets. We characterize equilibrium, and identify the dynamics of transaction prices, trading patterns, and the average quality in the market. When the horizon is finite, the surplus in the unique equilibrium exceeds the competitive surplus; as traders become perfectly patient,...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Bervoets, Sebastian; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of nested split graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function, complete networks, core-periphery networks, dominant group architectures, quasi-star networks, and quasi-complete networks can be...
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作者：Koenig, Michael D.; Lorenz, Jan; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Zurich; Constructor University
摘要：We develop a tractable dynamic model of productivity growth and technology spillovers that is consistent with the emergence of real world empirical productivity distributions. Firms can improve productivity by engaging in in-house research and developmenmt (R&D) or, alternatively, by trying to imitate other firms' technologies, subject to the limits of their absorptive capacities. The outcome of both strategies is stochastic. The choice between in-house R&D and imitation is endogenous, and is ...
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作者：Chan, Jimmy H.; Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Side-payments are common in many long-term relationships. We show that when players can exchange side-payments, approximate efficiency is achievable in any repeated game with private monitoring and communication, as long as the players can observe their own payoffs and are sufficiently patient, the efficient stage-game outcome is unique, and the signal distribution has full support. Unlike existing results in the literature, our result does not require deviations to be statistically detectable.
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作者：Koenig, Michael D.
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：This paper analyzes the formation of networks in which each agent is assumed to possess some information of value to the other agents in the network. Agents derive payoff from having access to the information of others through communication or spillovers via the links between them. Linking decisions are based on network-dependent marginal payoff and a network-independent noise capturing exogenous idiosyncratic effects. Moreover, agents have a limited observation radius when deciding to whom to...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to 1 as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averseexhibit Ellsberg-type behavioras modeled by maxmin expected utility preferences. It provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability of the correct candidate ...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states, the payoff functions, and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the players receive in the game. We characterize the set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observe the given information structure but may also observe additional signals. The char...
