Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava
• 署名单位: Concordia University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1529
• 发表日期: 2015-09-01
• 页码: 867-885
• 关键词: Voting rules; ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility; positive correlation; robustness with respect to beliefs

摘要

We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k-best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called top-set (TS) correlation. We characterize the set of ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) (d'Aspremont and Peleg 1988) voting rules with TS-correlated beliefs and additionally satisfy robustness with respect to local perturbations. We provide an example of a voting rule that satisfies OBIC with respect to all TS-correlated beliefs. The generally positive results contrast sharply with the negative results obtained for the independent case by [Majumdar and Sen, 2004] and parallel similar results in the auction design model (Cremer and McLean 1988).