Matching to share risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Reny, Philip J.
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1914
• 发表日期: 2016-01-01
• 页码: 227-251
• 关键词: Negatively assortative matching; risk sharing; stable match

摘要

We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (males and females) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits nontransferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched couples, the more risk averse male is matched with the less risk averse female.