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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Gerber, Anke
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Hamburg
摘要：We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the po...
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作者：Bich, Philippe; Laraki, Rida
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper studies the existence of equilibrium solution concepts in a large class of economic models with discontinuous payoff functions. The issue is well understood for Nash equilibria, thanks to Reny's better-reply security condition (Reny, 1999) and its recent improvements (Barelli and Meneghel, 2013, McLennan et al.., 2011, Reny 2009, 2011). We propose new approaches, related to Reny's work, and obtain tight conditions for the existence of approximate equilibria and of sharing rule solut...
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作者：Baisa, Brian
作者单位：Amherst College
摘要：I study the canonical private value auction model for a single good without the quasilinearity restriction. I assume only that bidders are risk averse and the indivisible good for sale is a normal good. I show that removing quasilinearity leads to qualitatively different solutions to the auction design problem. Expected revenue is no longer maximized using standard auctions that allocate the good to the highest bidder. Instead, the auctioneer better exploits bidder preferences by using a mecha...
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作者：Pycia, Marek; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：The allocation and exchange of discrete resources, such as transplant organs, public housing, dormitory rooms, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand, is often conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary transfers. Incentive compatibility and efficiency are primary concerns when designing such mechanisms. We construct the full class of group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanisms and show that each of them can be implemented by endowing agents with contr...
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作者：Suzuki, Toru
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：When an agent's motivation is sensitive to how his supervisor thinks about the agent's competence, the supervisor has to take into account both informational and expressive contents of her message to the agent. This paper shows that the supervisor can credibly express her trust in the agent's ability only by being unclear about what to do. Suggesting what to do, i.e., directives, could reveal the supervisor's distrust and reduce the agent's equilibrium effort level even though it provides usef...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibility is satisfied, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be brought to bear on the problem. The approach allows classic justifications of the first-order approach (FOA) to be proven using the same unifying methodology. However, the approach is especially useful for ...
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作者：Hiller, Timo
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：I propose a simple model of signed network formation, where agents make friends to extract payoffs from weaker enemies. The model thereby accounts for the interplay between friendship and alliance on one hand and enmity and antagonism on the other. Nash equilibrium configurations are such that either everyone is friends with everyone or agents can be partitioned into different sets, where agents within the same set are friends and agents in different sets are enemies. Any strong Nash equilibri...
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作者：Eso, Peter; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper generalizes a conceptual insight in dynamic contracting with quasilinear payoffs: the principal does not need to pay any information rents for extracting the agent's new private information obtained after signing the contract. This is shown in a general model in which the agent's type stochastically evolves over time, and her payoff (which is linear in transfers) depends on the entire history of private and any contractible information, contractible decisions, and her hidden actions...
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作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is large or small.
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作者：Dean, Mark; Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behavior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both objective lotteries and uncertain acts. We show that this axiom, together with other standard ones, is equivalent to a representation in which the agent (i) evaluates ambiguity using multiple priors, as ...
