Fairness and externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Velez, Rodrigo A.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1651
• 发表日期: 2016-01-01
• 页码: 381-410
• 关键词: Equity; EFFICIENCY; other-regarding preferences; equal income competitive allocations; first welfare theorem

摘要

We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with other-regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley's (1967) equity test, i.e., the requirement that no agent prefers the allocation obtained by swapping her consumption with another agent, is suitable for our environment. Then we establish the existence of allocations passing this test for a general domain of preferences that accommodates prominent other-regarding preferences. Our results are relevant for equitable allocation among inequity-averse agents and in a domain with linear externalities that we introduce. Finally, we present conditions guaranteeing that these allocations are efficient.