Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oyama, Daisuke; Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1405
• 发表日期: 2015-01-01
• 页码: 243-281
• 关键词: Evolutionary game dynamics; almost global convergence; iterated p-dominance; equilibrium selection

摘要

We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in super-modular games, an almost globally asymptotically stable state must be an iterated p-dominant equilibrium. Since our selection results are for deterministic dynamics, any selected equilibrium is reached quickly; the long waiting times associated with equilibrium selection in stochastic stability models are absent.