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作者：Evans, Lewis; Guthrie, Graeme
作者单位：Victoria University Wellington
摘要：This article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms investment behavior and welfare-maximizing regulation of price and quantity. Regulated firms invest in smaller, more frequent, increments than social planners, with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale. Regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate, and at higher levels when they are substantial. When quantity is also regulated, the average cost of building capa...
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作者：Farrell, Joseph; Simcoe, Timothy
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Consensus standardization often involves bargaining without side payments or substantive compromise, creating a war of attrition that selects through delay. We investigate the trade-off between screening and delay when this process selects for socially valuable but privately observed quality. Immediate random choice may outperform the war of attrition, or vice versa. Allowing an uninformed neutral player to break deadlocks can improve on both mechanisms. Policies that reduce players vested int...
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作者：Lewis, Tracy R.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principals ability to delegate depends on the agents luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search ...
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作者：Wright, Julian
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：I formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two-sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on b...
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作者：Piccolo, Salvatore; Miklos-Thal, Jeanine
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Rochester
摘要：This article investigates downstream firms ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above-cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about whole...
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作者：Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementationas under public--private partnershipscan bring in terms of project design an...
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作者：Toth, Aron
作者单位：University of Bath
摘要：Industry dynamics are studied as an endogenous tournament with infinite horizon and stochastic entry. In each period, firms investments determine their probability of surviving into the next period. This generates a survival contest, which fuels market structure dynamics, while the evolution of market structure constantly redefines the contest. More concentrated markets endogenously generate less profit, rivals that are more difficult to outlive, and more entry. The unique steady-state distrib...
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作者：Gavazza, Alessandro
作者单位：New York University
摘要：When consumers concentrate their purchases at a single firm, firms that offer more products than their rivals gain market share for all their products. These spillovers induce firms to offer a greater variety of products rather than lower prices, and a concentrated industry with few large firms can arise if spillovers are strong enough. This article presents a simple model that illustrates this mechanism explicitly. The empirical analysis documents strong demand spillovers in the retail segmen...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muehlheusser, Gerd
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Hamburg
摘要：We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone andunder some additional restrictionshump-shaped and U-shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and ...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Florence
摘要：Electronic academic journal websites provide text and data mining (and linking) services. Fully realizing the benefit of these services requires interconnection among websites. We perform a comparison between multilateral interconnection through an open platform and bilateral interconnection, and find that publishers are fully interconnected in the former regime whereas they are often partially interconnected in the latter regime for exclusion or differentiation motives. If partial interconnec...
