-
作者：Rey, Patrick; Whinston, Michael D.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of , who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit-maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to thi...
-
作者：Hong, Han; Paarsch, Harry J.; Xu, Pai
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Melbourne; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the common-value paradigm, we analyze the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and units gets large in a particular way. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the true, but ex ante unknown, value. Subsequently, we demonstrate that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian. Fi...
-
作者：Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarree, Jacques
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Sogang University
摘要：We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low-powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low-powe...
-
作者：Roberts, James W.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. I...
-
作者：Montez, Joao
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：This article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods. We study a standard durable-good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcomeincluding the Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once somebut not allhigh-valuation buyers purchase. This price st...
-
作者：Lampe, Ryan; Moser, Petra
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Patent pools, which combine complementary patents of competing firms, are expected to increase overall welfare but potentially discourage innovation in substitutes for the pool technology. This article exploits a new historical data set on changes in patenting and firm entry for a clearly defined pool technology and substitutes in the 19th-century sewing machine industry. This analysis reveals a substantial increase in innovation for an-albeit technologically inferior-substitute technology. Hi...
-
作者：Einav, Liran; Jenkins, Mark; Levin, Jonathan
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study the adoption of automated credit scoring at a large auto finance company and the changes it enabled in lending practices. Credit scoring appears to have increased profits by roughly a thousand dollars per loan. We identify two distinct benefits of risk classification: the ability to screen high-risk borrowers and the ability to target more generous loans to lower-risk borrowers. We show that these had effects of similar magnitude. We also document that credit scoring compressed profit...
-
作者：Schuett, Florian
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：Patent examination is a problem of moral hazard followed by adverse selection: examiners must have incentives to exert effort, but also to truthfully reveal the evidence they find. I develop a theoretical model to study the design of incentives for examiners. The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as the variation in compensation schemes and patent quality across patent offi...
-
作者：Farhi, Emmanuel; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants/sellers for three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from rejection. Second, nontransparency helps a certifier to increase his market power by raising the stigma from lower-tier certification. Third, transparency does not help screen among heterogeneous sellers. Strategic complementarities arise as sellers move down the certification pecking order and lead to the ...
-
作者：Galasso, Alberto; Schankerman, Mark; Serrano, Carlos J.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. We show that patent transactions arising from comparative advantages in commercialization increase litigation, but trades driven by advantages in patent enforcement reduce it. Using data on trade and litigation of individually owned patents in the United States, we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates across states as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strong...
