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作者：Ellickson, Paul B.; Houghton, Stephanie; Timmins, Christopher
作者单位：University of Rochester; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We measure the effects of chain economies, business stealing, and heterogeneous firms' comparative advantages in the discount retail industry. Traditional entry models are ill suited for this high-dimensional problem of strategic interaction. Building upon recently developed profit inequality techniques, our model admits any number of potential rivals and stores per location, an endogenous distribution network, and unobserved (to the econometrician) location attributes that may cause firms to ...
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public-private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The go...
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作者：Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Paer; Philpott, Andrew B.
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Auckland
摘要：We introduce the concept of an offer distribution function to analyze randomized offer curves in multiunit procurement auctions. We characterize mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for pay-as-bid auctions where demand is uncertain and costs are common knowledge, a setting for which pure-strategy supply function equilibria typically do not exist. We generalize previous results on mixtures over horizontal offers as in Bertrand-Edgeworth games and also characterize novel mixtures over partly increasin...
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作者：Hoerner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We examine a repeated interaction between an agent who undertakes experiments and a principal who provides the requisite funding. A dynamic agency cost arises-the more lucrative the agent's stream of rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives, giving the principal a motivation to reduce the project's continuation value. We characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. Efficient equilibria front-load the agent's effort, inducing maximum experimentation over an init...
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作者：Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua
作者单位：Peking University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or two-stage auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are taken, deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show tha...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Michigan State University
摘要：We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) quality or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) agenda or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision-maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b)...
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作者：Dunne, Timothy; Klimek, Shawn D.; Roberts, Mark J.; Xu, Daniel Yi
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Duke University
摘要：This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are important determinants of long-run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated m...
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作者：Fukuda, Emiko; Kamijo, Yoshio; Takeuchi, Ai; Masui, Michiharu; Funaki, Yukihiko
作者单位：National Defense Academy - Japan; Kochi University Technology; Ritsumeikan University; Waseda University
摘要：Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the locally envy-free Nash equilibrium to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the a...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm's control system fails, I introduce a measure of earnings quality, based on the notion of integral precision, that has solid theoretical foundations. A trade-off between the frequency and the magnitude of overstatements is shown: overstatements are larger when misreporting is less likely. Overall, the model generates a distribution of earnings announcements similar to its empirical analogue and provides a...
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作者：Yang, Huanxing
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We develop a search model to explain the long tail effect. Search targetability, or the quality of search, is explicitly modelled. Consumers are searching for the right products within the right categories. As search costs decrease, or search targetability increases, additional variety of goods catering to long tail consumers will be provided, and the concentration of sales across different categories of goods decreases. The effects of a decrease in search costs or an increase in search target...
