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作者：Ding, Wei; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Korea University
摘要：The literature on research and development contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present article analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit himself to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest. We compare fixed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result...
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作者：Bourjade, Sylvain; Jullien, Bruno
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); Universite de Toulouse; TBS Education; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert's incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the con...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We model the dynamic process wherein two privately informed plaintiffs may file and combine related lawsuits in order to lower trial costs and/or improve the likelihood of winning. The equilibrium resembles a bandwagon: some plaintiff types file early, whereas others wait and only file suit if they observe a previous filing. Finally, some plaintiff types never file and some early filers drop their suits if not joined by another plaintiff. We then consider the effect of allowing preemptive sett...
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作者：Mukherjee, Arijit; Vasconcelos, Luis
作者单位：Michigan State University; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follow...
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作者：Khanna, Naveen; Mathews, Richmond D.
作者单位：Michigan State University; Duke University
摘要：Existing models show that herding in decisions can cause significant information loss, inferior information aggregation, and impaired decision making. However, we show that in a multistage decision setting with endogenous information production, herding on the initial decision can actually result in superior aggregate information and improved decisions. This is because the possibility of herding by a follower incentivizes the leader to increase its ex ante information production to an extent t...
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作者：Ciapanna, Emanuela
摘要：This article analyzes the practice of opportunistic poaching of consultants by clients, with particular reference to the business consulting industry. The strategic interaction of consulting groups, client firms, and consultants gives rise to a market equilibrium in a mixed economy. Under very general conditions, whenever a match client-consultant is formed, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where the consulting group pleases the client's request and the consultant is poached by the client. T...
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作者：Tang, Xun
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders' values and private signals. This poses a challenge when bids are observed from first-price, common-value auctions. I bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure. Using data from U.S. municipal bond auctions, I find first-price and second-price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in r...
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作者：Goltsman, Maria
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship-specific investment and renegotiation. In such a setting, a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model, namely that of transmitting information between the parties. The article shows that a partial-disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract. If the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is as...
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作者：Auray, Stephane; Mariotti, Thomas; Moizeau, Fabien
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Rennes; University of Sherbrooke
摘要：We develop a dynamic regulation model of quality provision where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have a durable impact. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetric information can lead to overprovision of quality, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect. When the regulator contracts with a single agent, the efficiency of their relationship depends on the regulator's ability to transfer rents across periods. Hiring a single agent with unlimited liability is soc...
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作者：Gilpatric, Scott M.; Vossler, Christian A.; McKee, Michael
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University
摘要：This article adds to the regulatory compliance literature through the theoretical development and experimental testing of two endogenous audit mechanisms that use contemporaneous relative comparisons, based on disclosed information or imperfect signals of compliance effort, to generate a compliance competition among agents. This type of audit mechanism has some advantages over the more widely studied dynamic audit mechanisms that condition an agent's audit probability on past compliance, and p...
