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作者：Ershov, Daniel; Mitchell, Matthew
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Toronto
摘要：We study the effects of advertising disclosure regulations in social media markets. Using data from a large sample of Instagram influencers in Germany and Spain and a difference-in-differences approach, we empirically evaluate the effects of German strengthening of disclosure regulations on post content and follower engagement. We measure whether posts include suggested disclosure terms and use text-based approaches (keywords, machine learning) to assess whether a post is sponsored. We show su...
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作者：Luo, Yao; Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of Toronto; Kyoto University
摘要：Procurement projects often involve substantial uncertainty in inputs at the time of contracting. Whether the procurer or contractor assumes such risk depends on the specific contractual agreement. We develop a model of auction contracts where bidders have multidimensional private information. Bidders balance skewed bidding and risk exposure; both efficient and inefficient bidders submit a low bid via skewed bidding. We document evidence of i) risk-balancing behavior through bid portfolio forma...
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作者：Hovenkamp, Erik; Lemus, Jorge; Turner, John L.
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Innovative product developers are often uninformed about relevant patents. Patentees may exploit this by strategically lurking-refraining from ex ante licensing in the hope that developers will unwittingly infringe, creating an opportunity for patent holdup. We contribute to the literature by introducing a framework to explore when strategic lurking is profitable and how it affects developers' technology decisions. We find that lurking is pervasive in equilibrium, and it may lead to inefficien...
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作者：Li, Hanzhe
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：How does the politician's reputation concern affect information provision when the information is endogenously provided by a biased lobbyist? I develop a model to study this problem and show that the answer depends on the transparency design. When the lobbyist's preference is publicly known, the politician's reputation concern induces the lobbyist to provide more information. When the lobbyist's preference is unknown, the politician's reputation concern may induce the lobbyist to provide less ...
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作者：Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E.
作者单位：Yonsei University; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：This article investigates contracts between two risk-neutral parties with bounded bonus payments. If the available signal about the agent's behavior satisfies a novel condition, the monotone likelihood ratio transformation property, the optimal contract takes a simple form irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not. The contract rewards the agent the maximum bonus if the signal's likelihood ratio exceeds a threshold, which in contrast to the FOA contract is not nece...
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作者：Duarte, Marco; Magnolfi, Lorenzo; Roncoroni, Camilla
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Warwick
摘要：Consumer cooperatives are firms owned by their customers. Although their organizational form should commit these firms not to exploit their market power, in practice, weak governance may allow managers to pursue other objectives. Using data and a structural model, we test whether consumer cooperatives in the Italian supermarket industry act as profit-maximizing firms. We find no significant deviations from profit maximization. Based on a counterfactual exercise, even a mild degree of internali...
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作者：Knutsen, Magnus Vage
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：I set up a dynamic experience goods model where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where the seller has reputational concerns. The key innovation of the article is to endogenize prices in this framework, specifically by endowing either the seller or the buyers with the ability to post price. I show that influence over prices has a strong impact on equilibrium characteristics. If the seller posts price, equilibria will display work-shirk dynamics. If the buy...
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作者：Domnisoru, Ciprian; Schiopu, Ioana
作者单位：Aalto University; Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE)
摘要：For-profit colleges have increased their share of the 4-year college market, particularly among nontraditional and online students, raising concerns about post-graduation outcomes. We set up and calibrate a general equilibrium model of college choice to analyze how for-profits compete with public and private nonprofit institutions. We quantify their response to changes in Pell Grant caps, public university subsidies, and gainful employment legislation linking federal funding to graduates' debt...
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作者：Harrington Jr, Joseph E.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In markets with price discrimination, firms can face a trade-off when colluding. To maintain price discrimination, upper-level executives may have to involve lower-level employees with the requisite demand information but that enhances the risk of the cartel's discovery. They could instead centralize pricing authority, but that means less price discrimination. Here, we consider a third option, which is for executives to coordinate on inflating the cost used in pricing by lower-level employees....
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作者：Bonnet, Celine; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra; Molina, Hugo
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; AgroParisTech; INRAE; Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer-retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an equilibrium of fear. We estimate our framework in the French soft drink industry and find that retailers have greater bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations, we highlight that retail ...
