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作者：Pozzi, Andrea
摘要：I examine the introduction of an online shopping service by a large supermarket chain also operating a network of brick-and-mortar stores. The establishment of the Internet channel led to a 13 percent increase in overall revenues, with limited cannibalization of traditional sales. I study the mechanisms underlying this result, focusing on two areas. First, I demonstrate the importance of the reduction of customers' travel costs in the attraction of new business. Second, I provide some evidence...
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I examine how the increasing ability of firms to target their ads influences market outcomes when consumers have access to advertising-avoidance tools. Although firms generally benefit from improved targeting, consumers need not. I also show that there may be too little blocking of ads in equilibrium and consider the role of targeted advertising when niche firms compete against mass-market firms.
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作者：Petrin, Amil; Levinsohn, James
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：We define aggregate productivity growth (APG) as the change in aggregate final demand minus the change in the aggregate expenditures on labor and capital. We show how to aggregate plant-level data to this quantity and how to decompose APG into technical efficiency and reallocation components. This requires us to confront the non-neoclassical features that impact plant-level data, including plant-level heterogeneity, the entry and exit of goods, adjustment costs, fixed and sunk costs, and marke...
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作者：Parrotta, Pierpaolo; Pozzoli, Dario
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Lausanne
摘要：This article focuses on the phenomenon of interfirm labor mobility as a potential channel for knowledge transfer. Using data from the Danish employer-employee register covering the period 19952005, we investigate how knowledge carrierstechnicians and highly educated workers recruited from a donor firmcontribute to knowledge diffusion and enhanced productivity in the hiring (recipient) firm. Structural estimation of the hiring firms' production functions shows that the impact of the recruitment...
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作者：Carvell, Daniel; Currie, Janet; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：Most U.S. states have enacted JSL reform, the move from a regime of joint and several liability (JSL) that allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from any one of multiple defendants to one where defendants are held liable only for the harm they cause. Contrary to previous theoretical work, we show that JSL reform can increase precaution by judgment proof agent by giving deep pockets an incentive to reduce their own liability by bringing judgment-proof agents into court. This result can help ...
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作者：Saini, Viplav
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Oberlin College
摘要：We show how to numerically solve for a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity-constrained firms. We find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes. Otherwise, firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric, which softens competition and increases procurement costs. We also find that forward-looking bidding dampens the competition-softening effects ...
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作者：Poblete, Joaquin; Spulber, Daniel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Northwestern University
摘要：The analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. We introduce a critical ratio that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state. The form of the contract is debt (a capped bonus) when the critical ratio is increasing (decreasing) in the state. An increasing critical ratio in the state-space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced-form d...
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作者：Filson, Darren
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College
摘要：I introduce a computable dynamic equilibrium model of the pharmaceutical industry, parameterize it using industry facts, and use it to predict what happens if the United States adopts price controls or one or more non-U.S. countries abandon their controls. The model generates implications for firm value, research and development (R&D), the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare. I highlight the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about R&D costs, market size, technological o...
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作者：Rojas, Christian
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Motivated by the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models, we construct lab experiments to test the effects of two factors on collusion: information (regarding next period's demand state) and monitoring (of a rival's past action). Results indicate that information may facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. A robust finding is that subjects in the Rotemberg and Saloner treatment cooperate as predicted by this theory: collusion f...
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作者：Farias, Vivek; Saure, Denis; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Columbia University
摘要：In this article, we introduce a new method to approximate Markov perfect equilibrium in large-scale Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic oligopoly models that are not amenable to exact solution due to the curse of dimensionality. The method is based on an algorithm that iterates an approximate best response operator using an approximate dynamic programming approach. The method, based on mathematical programming, approximates the value function with a linear combination of basis functions. We...
