Sequential location games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Loertscher, Simon; Muehlheusser, Gerd
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; University of Hamburg
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00148.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 639-663
• 关键词: free entry; market power; COMPETITION; differentiation; equilibrium; STABILITY; PRODUCTS; benefits; mergers; CHOICE

摘要

We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone andunder some additional restrictionshump-shaped and U-shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner-take-all competition, trade-offs between profits in the short and the long run, and firms operating multiple outlets.