Colluding through suppliers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piccolo, Salvatore; Miklos-Thal, Jeanine
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00183.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 492-513
• 关键词: resale price maintenance; repeated games; TRANSPARENCY; collusion; bertrand

摘要

This article investigates downstream firms ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above-cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.