Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00181.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 442-474
• 关键词: Moral hazard; INFORMATION; privatization; incentives; OWNERSHIP; CONTRACTS

摘要

We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementationas under public--private partnershipscan bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.