A theory of delegated search for the best alternative

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lewis, Tracy R.
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00179.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 391-416
• 关键词: Principal-agent problem; repeated moral hazard; unemployment-insurance; INFORMATION; time; INNOVATION; ECONOMICS

摘要

Searching for the best worker, a reliable supply alternative, or the most profitable investment is frequently delegated to an agent. This article develops a theory of delegated search. We show that the principals ability to delegate depends on the agents luck, her initial resources, and the contract that governs her search. With moral hazard, the optimal contract is characterized by performance deadlines with bonuses for early completion. If performance cannot be specified, the optimal search is implemented by an option-to-buy contract for the principal. If performance is partially specified, the optimal contract is a standard pay-for-performance arrangement.