Choosing the rules for consensus standardization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Farrell, Joseph; Simcoe, Timothy
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00164.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 235-252
• 关键词: intellectual property-rights; WAR; committees; patents; MODEL

摘要

Consensus standardization often involves bargaining without side payments or substantive compromise, creating a war of attrition that selects through delay. We investigate the trade-off between screening and delay when this process selects for socially valuable but privately observed quality. Immediate random choice may outperform the war of attrition, or vice versa. Allowing an uninformed neutral player to break deadlocks can improve on both mechanisms. Policies that reduce players vested interest, and hence delays, can strengthen the ex ante incentive to improve proposals.