Why payment card fees are biased against retailers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wright, Julian
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 761-780
• 关键词: interchange; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS

摘要

I formalize the popular argument that retailers pay too much and cardholders too little to make use of payment card platforms, resulting in excessive use of cards. To do this, I analyze a standard two-sided market model of a payment card platform. With minimal additional restrictions, the model implies that the privately set fee structure is unambiguously biased against retailers in favor of cardholders, a result that continues to hold even if the platform can perfectly price discriminate on both sides. The market failure arising is primarily a regulatory problem and does not raise any competition concerns.