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作者：Dranove, David; Garthwaite, Craig; Hermosilla, Manuel
作者单位：Northwestern University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：Prior literature shows that stronger consumer demand leads to increased pharmaceutical R&D. However, how strong these demand-pull effects are for more scientifically novel drug innovation remains unknown. We address this question using comprehensive clinical trial data that include precise characterizations of the scientific approaches used in tested molecules. We characterize scientific novelty as the number of times each approach has been used in the past. Exploiting exogenous demand variati...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. T...
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作者：Chen, Bo; Chen, Bo; Knyazev, Dmitriy
作者单位：Shenzhen MSU-BIT University; Hubei University of Economics; University of Vienna
摘要：We study information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize (Taylor, 1995). Different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for contest sponsors. We analyze and compare various information disclosure policies in the contest with finite or infinite horizons. With an endo...
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作者：Dogan, Mustafa; Hu, Ju
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Peking University
摘要：This article studies an information design problem in a sequential consumer search environment. Consumers, whose valuation of firms' products is uncertain, observe a noisy signal about the valuation upon being matched with a firm. The goal is to characterize those signal structures that maximize consumer surplus. We show that the consumer-optimal signal structure can be found within the class of conditional unit-elastic demand signal distributions. A rich set of properties and comparative stat...
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作者：Fanning, Jack; Kloosterman, Andrew
作者单位：Brown University; University of Virginia
摘要：We conduct a novel experimental test of the Coase conjecture based on subjects' privately known preferences for fairness. In an infinite horizon bargaining game, a proposer proposes a division of chips, until a responder accepts. When players are patient, the Coase conjecture predicts almost immediate agreement on equal monetary payoffs given any possibility a responder will not accept anything less. Behavior closely matches theory. In particular, when chips are worth more to proposers than re...
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作者：Tudon, Jose
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：This article studies the efficient use of prioritizing certain content over others in Amazon's Twitch.tv, a live streaming service, taking into account the trade-off between entry and congestion. I specify and estimate supply and demand models for live video, and a congestion model. Using technological shocks, I identify congestion costs for content providers and their consumers. Using shocks in prioritization, I identify its benefits. With estimated preferences and technological parameters, I...
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作者：Stiebale, Joel; Szuecs, Florian
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：We analyze the effects of M&A on the markups of non-merging rival firms across a broad set of industries. We exploit expert market definitions from the European Commission's merger decisions to identify relevant competitors in narrowly defined product markets and estimate markups as a measure of market power. Our results indicate that rivals increase their markups after mergers. Consistent with increases in market power, the effects are particularly pronounced when pre-merger concentration is ...
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作者：Shurtz, Ity; Eizenberg, Alon; Alkalay, Adi; Lahad, Amnon
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Clalit Health Services
摘要：Primary care is a notable example of a service industry where capacity-constrained suppliers face fluctuating demand levels. To meet this challenge, physicians trade off their time with patients with other inputs such as lab tests and referrals. We study this tradeoff using administrative data from a large Israeli HMO where the absence of colleagues generates exogenous variation in physician workload. We motivate and estimate a range of specifications, from a classic exclusion restriction with...
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作者：Balzer, Benjamin; Schneider, Johannes
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We study optimal methods for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), a technique to achieve settlement and avoid costly adversarial hearings. Participation is voluntary. Disputants are privately informed about their marginal cost of evidence provision. If ADR fails to engender settlement, the disputants can use the information obtained during ADR to determine what evidence to provide in an adversarial hearing. Optimal ADR induces an asymmetric information structure but makes the learning report-...
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作者：Goldmanis, Maris; Ray, Korok
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We model a moral hazard in teams problem in which a profit-maximizing principal offers private contracts to multiple agents. Public contracts are common knowledge to all agents, but private contracts are known only by the principal and each individual agent. Public contracts can induce efficient outcomes but are subject to effort-reducing collusion between the principal and any given agent. Private contracts, by construction, are immune to such collusion but necessarily inefficient, as the pri...
