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作者：Bhaskar, V; Roketskiy, Nikita
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption choices cannot be deterministic. Thus, ex post heterogeneity in preferences arises endogenously. Consumer privacy improves social welfare, consumer surplus and the profits of the second-period seller, while reducing the profits of the first period seller, relativ...
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作者：Mitchell, Matthew
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Consumers rely on intermediaries (influencers) such as social media recommendations to provide information about products. The advice may be mixed with endorsement in a way that is unobservable to the follower, creating a trade-off for influencers between the best advice and the most revenue. This article models the dynamic relationship between an influencer and a follower. The relationship evolves between periods of less and more revenue. The model can provide insight into policies such as th...
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作者：Cao, Guangyu; Jin, Ginger Zhe; Weng, Xi; Zhou, Li-An
作者单位：Peking University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using staggered entry of two dockless bike-sharing firms, we study whether the entrant expands or steals the market from the incumbent in 59 cities. Compared with 23 cities without entry, the entry helps the incumbent to serve more trips, make more bike investment, achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization, and form a wider and more dispersed network. The market-expanding effect on new users dominates a significant market-stealing effect on old users. These findings, plus a the...
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作者：Hester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Munich; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education, and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non-contractible. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our results feature new auditing pat...
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作者：Yang, Chenyu
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This article studies how vertical integration and upstream R&D subsidy affect innovation and welfare in vertically separated industries. I formulate a dynamic structural model of a dominant upstream firm and oligopolistic downstream firms that invest in complementary innovations. I estimate the model using data on the System-on-Chip (SoC) and smartphone industries. The results suggest that a vertical merger can increase innovation and welfare, mainly driven by the investment coordination of th...
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作者：Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene)
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay. In high-stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the se...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London
摘要：Nonretail platforms enable users to engage in noncommercial activities, while generating user information that helps ad targeting. We present a model in which the platform chooses a personalized ad-display rule and an advertising fee (which depends on the targeted user group). The policy that maximizes the platform's advertising revenues creates an incentive for advertisers to strategize targeting. We provide a condition for incentive-compatibility of the first-best policy, and highlight the f...
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作者：Bevia, Carmen; Corchon, Luis C.; Yasuda, Yosuke
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Osaka
摘要：We model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. For some parameter values, the Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm, eventually, will exit the market with probability one. Producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration, because the outcome that maximizes joint profits ...
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作者：Pinkovskiy, Maxim L.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：The health spending slowdown associated with the managed care revolution in the 1990s suggests that managed care may have been successful in controlling health care spending. I exploit the passage of state regulation during the managed care backlash as well as geographic variation in managed care intensity to measure the impact of managed care on spending. I find that restricting managed care causes a large and significant increase in hospital spending, which cannot be explained by changes in ...
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作者：Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre
作者单位：INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstances of the loss. Court decisions are based on a standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities. We show that an optimal insurance law brings efficiency gains compared to the no-audit case. We also...
