An experimental test of the Coase conjecture: Fairness in dynamic bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fanning, Jack; Kloosterman, Andrew
• 署名单位: Brown University; University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12403
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 138-165
• 关键词: sided incomplete information; durable-goods monopoly; game; rationality; COMPETITION

摘要

We conduct a novel experimental test of the Coase conjecture based on subjects' privately known preferences for fairness. In an infinite horizon bargaining game, a proposer proposes a division of chips, until a responder accepts. When players are patient, the Coase conjecture predicts almost immediate agreement on equal monetary payoffs given any possibility a responder will not accept anything less. Behavior closely matches theory. In particular, when chips are worth more to proposers than responders, initial offers, minimum acceptable offers, responder payoffs, and efficiency are significantly larger in infinite horizon games than ultimatum games, and proposer payoffs are significantly smaller.