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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Frank, Jeff; Koch, Alexander K.; Valente, Marieta
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Aarhus University; Universidade do Minho
摘要：Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow second-chance offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default wi...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Cremer, Jacques; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Imperial College London
摘要：We study incumbency advantage in markets with positive consumption externalities. Users of an incumbent platform receive stochastic opportunities to migrate to an entrant and can either accept them or wait for a future opportunity. In some circumstances, users have incentives to delay migration until others have migrated. If they all do so, no migration takes place, even when migration would have been Pareto-superior. We use our framework to identify environments where incumbency advantage is ...
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作者：Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Nevrekar, Saish
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Zurich; Tinbergen Institute; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Navarra; Tilburg University
摘要：This article studies mergers in markets where firms invest in a portfolio of research projects of different profitability and social value. The investment of a firm in one project imposes both a negative business-stealing and a positive business-giving externality on the rival firms. We show that when the project that is relatively more profitable for the firms appropriates a larger (smaller) fraction of the social surplus, a merger increases (decreases) consumer welfare by reducing investment...
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作者：Hagiu, Andrei; Teh, Tat-How; Wright, Julian
作者单位：Boston University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore
摘要：A growing number of digital platforms operate in a dual mode: running marketplaces for third-party products, while selling their own products on those marketplaces. We build a model to explore the implications of this controversial practice. We analyze the tradeoffs that arise from a regulatory ban on the dual mode, showing how such a ban can harm consumer surplus and welfare even when the platform would otherwise engage in product imitation and self-preferencing. In the empirically most relev...
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作者：Birulin, Oleksii; Izmalkov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Sydney; New Economic School
摘要：We consider procurement auctions in settings where potential contractors have limited funds and face ex post risks, that is, cost overruns that can lead to the contractors' defaults. The bidding strategies and the default decisions are shaped by the incentive-willing to finish-constraints, and the resource-able to finish and feasibility-constraints. We examine payment schemes where the advance share of the award is paid immediately after the auction with the rest payable upon successful comple...
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作者：Gamp, Tobias; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a search market where firms may design products of inferior quality to promote them to naive consumers who misjudge product characteristics. We derive an equilibrium in which superior and inferior quality co-exist and show that as search frictions vanish, the share of superior goods goes to zero. The presence of inferior products harms sophisticated consumers, as it forces them to search longer for superior quality. Policy interventions that reduce search frictions such as the standar...
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作者：Raval, Devesh; Rosenbaum, Ted; Wilson, Nathan E.
摘要：Although diversion ratios are important inputs to merger evaluation, there is little evidence about how accurately discrete choice models predict diversions. Using a series of natural disasters that unexpectedly closed hospitals, we compare observed post-disaster diversion ratios to those predicted from pre-disaster data using standard models of hospital demand. We find that all standard models consistently underpredict large diversions. Both unobserved heterogeneity in preferences over travel...
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作者：Jeon, Jihye
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This article investigates the role of demand uncertainty in explaining cyclical investment fluctuations in the container shipping industry. I develop and estimate a dynamic oligopoly model with learning in which firms choose investment and scrapping. In this model, firms are uncertain about the true parameters in the underlying process for demand, and form and revise their beliefs using available information. Counterfactual analysis reveals that uncertainty about the demand process amplifies i...
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作者：Fershtman, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study platform markets in which agents arrive gradually, experience changes to their preferences over time, and are frequently re-matched. We introduce simple auctions specifically designed for such markets. Upon joining, agents select a status that determines the weight assigned to their future bids. Each match is then assigned a score that depends on the agents' reciprocal bids and status. The matches maximizing the sum of the bilateral scores are implemented. Under certain conditions, su...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study monitoring in a continuous-time career concerns model. A monitor oversees an agent and generates verifiable evidence if the agent shirks. The monitor's ability is uncertain and requires costly investment to maintain. Unpunished shirking reveals that the monitor is ineffective, which discourages the monitor from maintaining her ability. The agent shirks strategically to discourage the monitor, because shirking increases the rate of learning. Term limits reduce the incentive to shirk an...
