Information disclosure in dynamic research contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Bo; Chen, Bo; Knyazev, Dmitriy
• 署名单位: Shenzhen MSU-BIT University; Hubei University of Economics; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12402
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 113-137
• 关键词: feedback; search; prizes

摘要

We study information disclosure in a dynamic multi-agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner-takes-all prize (Taylor, 1995). Different disclosure policies on the agents' submissions induce different equilibrium behavior, making the design of disclosure a useful instrument for contest sponsors. We analyze and compare various information disclosure policies in the contest with finite or infinite horizons. With an endogenously chosen prize, the public disclosure policy, where submissions are revealed immediately, implements the sponsor's first-best research plan and is an optimal policy in the infinite horizon.