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作者：Andres-Cerezo, David; Fabra, Natalia
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We assess how firms' incentives to operate and invest in energy storage depend on the market structure. For this purpose, we characterize equilibrium market outcomes allowing for market power in storage and/or production, as well as for vertical integration between storage and production. Market power reduces overall efficiency through two channels: It induces an inefficient use of the storage facilities, and it distorts investment incentives. The worst outcome for consumers and total welfare ...
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作者：Rubens, Michael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：A key difference between managers and other production inputs is that managers choose the other inputs. Modelling management as a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter, which is a common practice, omits the productivity returns from these input decisions. I illustrate this through a historical episode in which technology choices were important and managers plausibly influenced those choices.I study the entry of the first mining college graduates into coal mine management positions in Pennsylvania...
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作者：Righi, Cesare; Simcoe, Timothy
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Continuations allow inventors to add new claims to old patents, leading to concerns about unintended infringement and holdup. We study how continuations are used in standard essential patent (SEP) prosecution. Difference in differences estimates suggest that continuation filings increase by 80%-121% after a standard is published. This effect is larger for applicants with licensing-based business models and for patent examiners with a higher allowance rate. Claim language is more similar for SE...
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作者：Lang, Matthias
作者单位：University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This article studies incentive contracts with stochastic compensation, like payments in stock options or uncertain arbitration procedures. These contracts incentivize employees without the need for payme...
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作者：Espin-Sanchez, Jose-Antonio; Parra, Alvaro; Wang, Yuzhou
作者单位：Yale University; University of British Columbia; Amazon.com
摘要：We study equilibria in static entry games with single-dimensional private information. Our framework embeds many models commonly used in applied work, allowing for firm heterogeneity and selective entry. We introduce the notion of strength, which summarizes a firm's ability to endure competition. In environments of applied interest, an equilibrium in which entry strategies are ordered according to the firms' strengths always exists. We call this equilibrium herculean. We derive simple and test...
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作者：Ho, Kate; Lee, Robin S.
作者单位：Princeton University; Harvard University
摘要：We provide a framework for large employers designing a menu of health plan offerings that differ on both financial and nonfinancial dimensions. Using administrative data from Harvard University, we estimate a model of plan choice and utilization, and evaluate the benefits of cost sharing and plan variety. For this population of consumers, and a single plan with a generous out-of-pocket maximum and zero deductible, modest cost sharing of approximately 30% maximizes average employee surplus. Gai...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This article establishes a tenuous link between ability and relative well-being in teamwork. It shows that higher-ability or lower-cost members can easily fare worse than their lower-ability counterparts due to free-riding. The extent of free-riding hinges crucially on log-concavity of effort cost, which its convexity restricts little. The article further shows how to compose teams that allocate effort efficiently and equalize payoffs in equilibrium. Efficient teams must have sufficiently dive...
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作者：Liu, Haoming; Lu, Jingfeng; Salvo, Alberto
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：We show that the prevalence of prolonged tennis contests drops sharply when the ambient environment deteriorates through heat or pollution. We develop a multi-battle dynamic model to investigate how the disutility from a protracted competition shapes agents' willingness to fight on. Our theory predicts that a poor environment amplifies the momentum of a competitor's head start. We show how model primitives including preferences for environmental amenities can be inferred from battle-to-battle ...
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作者：Palikot, Emil; Pietola, Matias
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Pay-for-delay patent settlements, in which the incumbent patentee pays a potential entrant to withdraw a patent challenge and stay out of the market, cost patients and taxpayers billions of dollars in higher pharmaceutical prices. We show that in markets with one incumbent and several entrants, the possibility of conditioning such settlements on litigation outcomes against other entrants results in the exclusion of all entrants from the market. When conditional contracts are infeasible, the in...
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作者：Preuss, Marcel
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In many search markets, some consumers search to learn both the price and their willingness-to-pay whereas others search only to learn prices. When a seller can track indicators of the likelihood that consumers already know their willingness-to-pay, I show that price discrimination reduces profits and welfare relative to uniform pricing if search costs are small, but may increase both if search costs are large. The analysis also applies to sequential search if learning causes the likelihood th...
