Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balzer, Benjamin; Schneider, Johannes
• 署名单位: University of Technology Sydney; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12374
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 415-445
• 关键词: reduced form auctions; LITIGATION; settlement; implementability; DESIGN

摘要

We study optimal methods for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), a technique to achieve settlement and avoid costly adversarial hearings. Participation is voluntary. Disputants are privately informed about their marginal cost of evidence provision. If ADR fails to engender settlement, the disputants can use the information obtained during ADR to determine what evidence to provide in an adversarial hearing. Optimal ADR induces an asymmetric information structure but makes the learning report-independent. It is ex ante fair and decreases the disputants' expenditures, even if they fail to settle. We highlight the importance of real-world mediation techniques, such as caucusing, for implementing optimal ADR.