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作者：Johnson, Justin P.; Rhodes, Andrew
作者单位：Cornell University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We investigate mergers in markets where quality differences between products are central and firms may reposition their product lines by adding or removing products of different qualities following a merger. Such mergers are materially different from those studied in the existing literature. Mergers without synergies may exhibit a product-mix effect which raises consumer surplus, but only when the pre-merger industry structure satisfies certain observable features. Post-merger synergies may lo...
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作者：Moscelli, Giuseppe; Gravelle, Hugh; Siciliani, Luigi
作者单位：University of York - UK; University of Surrey; University of York - UK
摘要：We investigate the effect on the quality of three high-volume non-emergency treatments of a reform that relaxed restrictions on patient choice of hospital. We employ a quasi difference-in-difference strategy and use control functions allowing for patient selection into providers correlated with unobserved morbidity. Public hospitals facing more rivals reduced quality, increased waiting times, and reduced length of stay for hip and knee replacements. This is likely due to regulated prices imply...
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作者：Cheng, Chen
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This article studies moral hazard in teams where workers' wages depend on two types of performance measures: objective team output and subjective evaluations. The evaluations include both self- and peer evaluations. I find that when evaluations become less subjective, workers' wages should be more sensitive not only to their evaluations but also to the team's output. I also show that subjective evaluations should be used in relative terms only when the degree of subjectivity is not too high. T...
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作者：Aghamolla, Cyrus; Corona, Carlos; Zheng, Ronghuo
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high-performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find...
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作者：Klein, Timo
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：Prices are increasingly set by algorithms. One concern is that intelligent algorithms may learn to collude on higher prices even in the absence of the kind of coordination necessary to establish an antitrust infringement. However, exactly how this may happen is an open question. I show how in simulated sequential competition, competing reinforcement learning algorithms can indeed learn to converge to collusive equilibria when the set of discrete prices is limited. When this set increases, the ...
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作者：Saltzman, Evan
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether common government policy interventions can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I establish conditions under which there exists a tradeoff in addressing underinsurance and underenrollment. I then estimate a model of the California ACA insurance exchange using consumer-level data to ...
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作者：Chan, Lester T.
作者单位：Xiamen University
摘要：Network effects typically generate multiple equilibria in two-sided markets. To overcome the methodological challenge of selecting an appropriate equilibrium, this article shows that many two-sided market models are weighted potential games, and therefore, a refinement of Nash equilibrium justified by many theoretical and experimental studies, potential maximization, pins down an equilibrium. Under potential maximization, platforms often subsidize one side and charge the other, that is, divide...
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作者：Leahy, Dermot; Neary, J. Peter
作者单位：Maynooth University; University of Oxford
摘要：We compare the effects of changes in trade costs on trade volumes and on the gains from trade under Cournot and Bertrand competition. In both cases, the threshold trade costs below which the possibility of trade affects the domestic firm's behavior is the same; and welfare is U-shaped under reasonable conditions. However, welfare is typically greater under Bertrand competition; for higher trade costs the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition, implying a van-der-Rohe Region; and,...
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作者：Chen, Yuyu; Igami, Mitsuru; Sawada, Masayuki; Xiao, Mo
作者单位：Peking University; Yale University; Hitotsubashi University; University of Arizona
摘要：We study how ownership affects productivity in the context of China's privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Its true impact remains unclear and controversial, partly because the government selectively privatized or liquidated nonperforming SOEs. To address this selection problem, we augment the Gandhi-Navarro-Rivers nonparametric production function to incorporate endogenous ownership changes. Results suggest private firms are 53% more productive than SOEs on average, but the benefi...
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作者：Donna, Javier D.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：I develop a structural model of urban travel to estimate long-run gasoline price elasticities. I model the demand for transportation services using a dynamic discrete-choice model with switching costs and estimate it using a panel dataset with public market-level data on automobile and public transit use in Chicago. Long-run own- (automobile) and cross- (transit) price elasticities are substantially more elastic than short-run elasticities. Elasticity estimates from static and myopic models ar...
