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作者：Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the ...
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作者：Brehm, Paul A.; Lewis, Eric
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Oberlin College; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We exploit a government oil lease lottery that randomly assigned leases to individuals and firms. We examine how initial misallocation affected trade, drilling, and production outcomes. When parcels are far from existing production, leases won by individuals have similar drilling and production outcomes as those won by firms. However, for parcels close to existing production, we find that leases are about 50% less likely to be drilled when they are won by firms. We find evidence that informati...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the...
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作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This article analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market with the higher aggregate cross-seller diversion ratio. We find that discrimination can improve allocative efficiency and present sufficient conditions, involving the pass-through rates and the marke...
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作者：Sheu, Gloria; Taragin, Charles
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We model a two-level supply chain where Nash bargaining occurs upstream and firms compete in a logit setting downstream, either via Bertrand price setting or an auction. The parameters can be calibrated with a discrete set of data on prices, margins, and market shares, facilitating use by antitrust practitioners. We perform numerical simulations to identify cases where modelling the full vertical structure is important and where harm is likely. We also examine the thwarted Anthem/Cigna merger ...
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作者：Gordon, Sidartha; Henry, Emeric; Murto, Pauli
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Aalto University; Aalto University
摘要：We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases when neighbors stop. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players do. In addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to an additional inefficiency linked to the order in which players stop. We discu...
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作者：Craig, Stuart V.; Grennan, Matthew; Swanson, Ashley
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University
摘要：We estimate the effects of hospital mergers, using detailed data containing medical supply transactions (representing 23% of operating costs) from a sample of US hospitals, 2009-2015. Pre-merger price variation across hospitals (Gini coefficient 7%) suggests significant opportunities for cost decreases. However, we observe limited evidence of actual savings. In this retrospective study, targets realized 1.9% savings; acquirers realized no significant savings. Examining treatment effect heterog...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Li, Jianpei; Schwartz, Marius
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of International Business & Economics; Georgetown University
摘要：We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial-more than price discrimination-but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consume...
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作者：Hollenbeck, Brett; Uetake, Kosuke
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Yale University
摘要：We study tax and regulatory policy in the legal marijuana market using unique administrative data from Washington state. Washington's retail entry restrictions have resulted in firms with substantial market power who behave like local monopolists. We show how the presence of market power causes tax and regulatory policy recommendations to differ from standard models that assume perfect competition. Combining structural demand models with measured pass-through, we show that marijuana is not ove...
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作者：Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private information about their cost of effort, and they exert unobservable effort. The optimal contract menu pairs a higher probability of assignment to a valuable project with a lower bonus in case of success. ...
