Team incentives under private contracting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goldmanis, Maris; Ray, Korok
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12371
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 334-358
• 关键词: Moral hazard; cost allocation; provision; agents; games

摘要

We model a moral hazard in teams problem in which a profit-maximizing principal offers private contracts to multiple agents. Public contracts are common knowledge to all agents, but private contracts are known only by the principal and each individual agent. Public contracts can induce efficient outcomes but are subject to effort-reducing collusion between the principal and any given agent. Private contracts, by construction, are immune to such collusion but necessarily inefficient, as the principal is forced to make the team collectively the residual claimant (on margin), whereas efficiency requires that each individual agent be the residual claimant on his own.