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作者：Khalil, F; Lawarrée, J
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored. If it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type. For cases of small asymmetry of information, the principal can implement the first best contract. For more serious asymmetries of infor...
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作者：Kramarz, F; Philippon, T
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In this article, we study the impact of changes of total labor costs on employment of low-wage workers in France in a period, 1990 to 1998, that saw sudden and large changes in these costs. We use longitudinal data from the French Labor Force survey (much less than enquete emploi much greater than) in order to understand the consequences of real decreases and real increases of the labor cost. We examine the transition probabilities from employment to non-employment and from non-employment to e...
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作者：Anderson, SP; de Palma, A; Kreider, B
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We analyze the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with differentiated products and price-setting (Bertrand) firms. Both taxes may be passed on to consumers by more than 100 percent, and an increase in the tax rate can increase short run firm profits (and hence the long run number of firms). We provide summary conditions for these effects to arise. The conditions depend on demand curvatures and are written in elasticity form. Surprisingly, the analysis la...
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作者：Polinsky, AM; Shavell, S
作者单位：Stanford University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze corruption in law enforcement: the payment of bribes to enforcement agents, threats to frame innocent individuals in order to extort money from them, and the actual framing of innocent individuals. Bribery, extortion, and framing reduce deterrence and are thus worth discouraging. Optimal penalties for bribery and framing are maximal, but, surprisingly, extortion should not be sanctioned. The state may also combat corruption by paying rewards to enforcement agents for reporting viola...
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作者：Ihori, T
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper investigates the effect of wealth taxation on economic growth using an endogenous growth model with the altruistic bequest motive. We introduce intragenerational productivity differentials of human capital formation, resulting in differences of growth rates among individuals. The economy is divided into two groups; those who leave bequests to physical capital investment and those who leave bequests to human capital investment. An increase in taxes on life cycle savings will reduce t...
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作者：Bradbury, JC; Crain, WM
作者单位：George Mason University; University System of Georgia; North Georgia College & State University
摘要：The Law of 1/n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending. Despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact, the Law of 1/n has received only limited empirical scrutiny, and the existing evidence for the American States provides mixed support for the thesis. This paper examines the Law of I In in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross-section of democratic countries. The results indicate that legislative size matter...
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作者：Guttman, JM
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：This paper presents a model of the emergence of cooperative social norms in a society composed exclusively of rational agents. Following Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245-252], opportunistic agents are assumed to uphold cooperative norms in order to maintain reputations for being trustworthy - reputations which are necessary in order to find partners in mutu...
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作者：Bird, EJ
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：In cross-national data on individual and country-level characteristics, the variance of log annual income is shown to correlate positively with indicators of redistribution. The database comes from the Panel Comparability (PACO) project, which provides uniquely comparable cross-national panel data, including both Eastern and Western Europe and the US. A random effects permanent income regression is used to estimate income variance. The variance,estimates are then regressed on individual and co...
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作者：Rubio, SJ; Escriche, L
作者单位：University of Valencia
摘要：This paper uses Wirl's [Wirl, F., 1995. The exploitation of fossil fuel under the threat of global warming and carbon taxes: A dynamic game approach. Environmental and Resource Economics, 5, 333-352.] model designed to analyze the long-term bilateral interdependence between a resource-exporting cartel and a coalition of resource-importing country governments for investigating under what conditions a carbon tax would make it possible for the coalition to appropriate part of the cartel's profits...
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作者：Brueckner, JK
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper offers an analysis of tax increment financing (TIF), adding to a small theoretical literature on this important fiscal instrument. The analysis exploits the theoretical connection between property values and public-good levels, which is the subject of a large literature in local public finance. Using this approach, the paper shows that localized public improvements are likely to be opposed by property owners outside the affected area, who pay higher property taxes with no offsetting...
